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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
George Banks was convicted by a Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania jury of having committed thirteen murders, 
and was sentenced to death. His direct appeals and filings 
under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") 
failed. He sought habeas corpus relief in the District Court 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, which was denied. He comes 
before us now to appeal the District Court's ruling. 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 1291 and 2253. The District Court granted a 
certificate of appealability as to whether the sentencing 
phase instructions and forms violated Mills v. Maryland, 
486 U.S. 367 (1988), under our precedent in Frey v. 
Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 
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U.S. 911 (1998). By order entered June 27, 2000, we 
agreed to expand the certificate of appealability to include 
the issue of whether Banks failed to make a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. 
 
Because Banks's habeas corpus petition was filed after 
April of 1996,1 the role of the District Court in reviewing the 
state court proceedings was governed by AEDPA.2 
Accordingly, the District Court's task was to determine 
whether the state court's decision was either contrary to or 
an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 
The District Court found no basis on which to dispute the 
state court's ruling. Because the question of whether the 
District Court appropriately applied the AEDPA standard of 
review is a question of law, we review its conclusions in 
that regard de novo. Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 




On September 25, 1982 in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, 
Banks shot fourteen people with a Colt AR-15 semi- 
automatic rifle, killing thirteen and wounding one. The AR- 
15 is a civilian version of the military's M-16 rifle. Banks 
began his deadly spree at his own home, where he shot and 
killed three of his girlfriends and their five children, four of 
whom Banks himself had fathered. Banks then left his 
home clad in what appeared to be military fatigues. On the 
street outside he happened upon a group of bystanders 
who had heard the shots. Banks shot and killed one, a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We discuss our view of the applicability of AEDPA specifically at 6-7, 
infra. 
 
2. 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) states: 
 
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 
 
 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
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young man who had recognized him, and also shot and 
seriously wounded another. Banks then carjacked a car 
and drove to a trailer park, where he shot another 
girlfriend, their son, a second boy, and the girlfriend's 
mother. Two other boys survived the attack. After a stand- 
off at a friend's house, Banks surrendered. 
 
At trial, the defense offered psychiatric experts who 
testified that Banks, who is bi-racial, suffered from 
paranoid psychosis and was convinced that he was a victim 
of a racist conspiracy. The theory was offered that he killed 
his children to save them from suffering racism as he had. 
Banks testified on his own behalf and insisted on referring 
to graphic, gruesome pictures of the murders to try to show 
that there was a government conspiracy against him. 
Banks alleged that his shots had only wounded, not killed, 
some of the victims, and that the police had fired the lethal 
shots, after which some of the bodies were moved. He also 
alleged that the medical examiner covered up some wounds 
and enlarged or altered others to distort the information 
presented to the jury. He sought throughout the trial to 
exhume the bodies. 
 
Banks was convicted by a state court jury of twelve 
counts of first degree murder, one count of third degree 
murder, criminal attempt to commit murder, two counts of 
recklessly endangering another person, robbery and theft 
by unlawful taking or disposition. In the penalty phase, the 
jury sentenced Banks to death and imprisonment. 
 
Banks filed direct appeals and sought collateral relief in 
the state courts, as well as filing for federal habeas corpus 
relief. We need not detail all these proceedings, except that 
one aspect of the procedural posture of the case deserves 
attention. The government had argued to the District Court 
that Banks's habeas corpus petition was not filed in a 
timely manner. Under AEDPA, Banks was required to file 
his petition within one year of April 24, 1996, unless the 
deadline was equitably tolled during the time a"properly 
filed" state petition for relief was pending. The government 
contended that because Banks's state court PCRA petition 
was filed late, it should not be deemed to have been 
"properly filed" for purposes of the tolling provisions under 
the federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(2). The 
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government based its argument in part on Lovasz v. 
Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) ("We believe that 
a `properly filed application' is one submitted according to 
the state's procedural requirements, such as the rules 
governing the time and place of filing."). 
 
The government relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's ruling in 1999 that the requirement for timely filing 
was "jurisdictional," rather than merely a statute of 
limitations. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 726 A.2d 374, 
376 (Pa. 1999) ("Banks VI"). The District Court did not 
accept that argument, however, noting that Banks could 
not be said to have been on notice prior to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's holding in Banks VI that the 
Commonwealth would consider S 9545(b) to be 
jurisdictional, and that, especially in light of relaxed waiver 
in capital cases, and the policy of equitable tolling, Banks 
should not be barred because he reasonably could have 
construed the time requirement as procedural only. See 
Banks v. Horn, 63 F. Supp. 2d 525, 533-34 (M.D. Pa. 1999) 
("Banks VIII"). The District Court noted that since the 
exceptions allowed courts to hear some untimely petitions, 
not every provision in the statute could be jurisdictional, 
and, absent clear jurisdictional language, it is"entirely 
reasonable to conclude that S 9545(b) is a statute of 
limitations rather than a jurisdictional provision." Id. at 
533. In Banks VI, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited to 
its decision in Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 (Pa. 
1998), petition for habeas corpus dismissed sub nom. 
Peterkin v. Horn, 34 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D. Pa. 1998), which 
states simply that the "General Assembly amended the 
PCRA to require that, as a matter of jurisdiction, a PCRA 
petition must be filed within one year of judgment," but the 
statement was not the court's holding, and the court did 
not elaborate on the reasoning underlying its conclusion. 
Peterkin, 722 A.2d at 641. Banks VI was the first time the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a court was 
deprived of jurisdiction when the deadline was not met. As 
the District Court noted, by concluding that the time 
limitation was jurisdictional, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court thought it was foreclosed from applying the relaxed 
waiver standard in Banks's case. 63 F. Supp. 2d at 533. 
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Banks argues that, quite apart from the issue of how the 
"properly-filed" requirement of 28 U.S.C.S 2244(d)(2) is 
construed, we should consider his habeas petition as 
properly before us. First, he urges that because his first 
petition was filed pre-AEDPA he is not bound by AEDPA's 
provisions. In the alternative, he takes the position that the 
issue of timeliness of his habeas petition is not even before 
us on appeal since the government has not challenged the 
District Court's ruling in its counterstatement of issues, 
and has failed to discuss the issue in its brief, except for its 
conclusory reference to its position in a footnote. 
 
Banks argues that his habeas petition was timely 
because it was not governed by AEDPA's one-year limitation 
period, but, rather, by pre-AEDPA law. In support of this 
theory, Banks urges that the habeas petition he filed in the 
District Court after AEDPA merely reasserted claims 
previously filed pre-AEDPA, so that it "relates back to the 
original filing date of Banks' pre-AEDPA petition." We 
disagree. The applicability of AEDPA does not turn upon a 
comparison of claims in successive petitions. It is, rather, 
governed solely by the date of the petition's filing. See, e.g., 
Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 103 (3d Cir. 1999); Jones v. 
Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1999). Any petition 
that is filed subsequent to AEDPA is governed by AEDPA 
standards. In his argument, Banks relies on Coss v. 
Lackawanna Cty. Dev. Auth., 204 F.3d 453 (3d Cir. 2000).3 
But Coss involved a unique factual setting in which Coss's 
petition was pending pre-AEDPA, and while it was pending, 
Coss filed another petition solely to remove the claims that 
the district court had held unexhausted. We thus viewed 
the second petition as "tantamount to a further amendment 
or clarification to the initial petition, filed at the direction of 
the District Court. . . ." 204 F.3d at 461. We were 
addressing the merits of his pre-AEDPA petition. If, instead, 
Coss's petition had been dismissed, and he had then filed 
either an identical petition or a petition absent the 
unexhausted claims after AEDPA's effective date, we would 
have been compelled to find that AEDPA controlled. Once a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on grounds not at issue 
here. See Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Atty. v. Coss , 531 U.S. 923 (2001). 
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petition has been dismissed, a subsequent petition is a new 
petition and is governed by AEDPA. 
 
As to Banks's contention that the issue as to whether his 
petition is time-barred is not before us because of the 
government's failure to specifically raise and brief the issue 
by way of cross-appeal, we believe that, in light of the 
District Court's careful analysis of this issue and its 
importance, and because the government did make 
reference to the issue albeit in a footnote -- we should 
examine whether the statutory filing requirements were 
met. Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 717-18 (1962).4 
 
Should Banks's second state court PCRA filed in January 
1997 be deemed properly filed such that the one-year 
AEDPA filing requirement did not begin to run until the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally ruled on it in March 
1999? If so, then Banks's habeas petition was filed in time. 
If not, then we need to decide whether the AEDPA one-year 
period barred his petition or whether it should be equitably 
tolled.5 
 
It seems clear that, technically, Banks's filing of his 
second PCRA in January 1997 was too late under 
Pennsylvania law. This is because the Pennsylvania 
legislature had enacted legislation in November 1995 
requiring all petitions, including second or successive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Even if not raised, we believe we could consider this issue sua sponte. 
"While ordinarily we do not take note of errors not called to the 
attention 
of the Court of Appeals nor properly raised here, that rule is not without 
exception. The Court has `the power to notice a`plain error' though it is 
not assigned or specified,' . . . `In exceptional circumstances, 
especially 
in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their 
own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the 
errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Silber, 370 
U.S. 
717-18 (internal citations omitted) See also Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 
117 (2d Cir. 2000); Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 
5. We note that the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Duncan v. Walker 
does not bear on this issue because here, unlike the situation in 
Duncan, the time period was violated unless there is equitable tolling for 
the state proceedings, even if the time during which Banks's first federal 
habeas petition was pending is taken into account. ___ U.S. ___, 121 S. 
Ct. 2120 (June 18, 2001). 
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petitions, to be filed within one year of the final order on 
direct appeal unless certain exceptions were met. 6 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 9545 (Act of November 17, 1995, Special 
Session No. 1 P.L. 1118, No. 32, effective in 60 days). 
 
However, was the petition therefore necessarily not 
"properly filed"? While we could explore this concept under 
the applicable Pennsylvania law and under the federal 
habeas case law, see, e.g., Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 
(2000), we need not do so, because we conclude that, even 
were we to decide that the late filing of Banks's second 
PCRA rendered it not "properly filed," the District Court 
appropriately called on equitable principles to toll the one- 
year AEDPA requirement given this unusual fact pattern. 
Here, as the District Court points out, the state of the 
Pennsylvania law regarding the nature of the filing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The text of the relevant statutory provision is: 
 
          (B) TIME FOR FILING PETITION.-- 
 
          (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or 
          subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date 
the 
          judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the 
          petitioner proves that: 
 
          (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 
          interference by government officials with the presentation of 
the 
          claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 
Commonwealth 
          or the Constitution or laws of the United States; 
 
          (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 
to 
          the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 
exercise 
          of due diligence; or 
 
          (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 
recognized 
          by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 
of 
          Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 
has 
          been held by that court to apply retroactively. 
 
          (2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) 
          shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have 
been 
          presented. 
 
          (3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at 
the 
          conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in 
the 
          Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 
          Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 
review. 
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requirement was unclear, and Banks could reasonably have 
viewed the state time limit as a mere statute of limitations 
subject to equitable tolling, not, as the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court later held in Banks VI, a jurisdictional 
requirement. The District Court noted that viewing this 
later ruling as a bar would result in unfair forfeiture 
without notice. Banks VIII at 534. This circumstance 
provides a basis for us to call on equitable principles in 
application of our own federal time parameters -- the one- 
year AEDPA requirement. 
 
We have recently had occasion to examine this issue. In 
Fahy v. Horn, we described the state of the law at the time 
of Fahy's fourth PCRA petition, which was also the time 
period when Banks's petition was pending, as "inhibitively 
opaque." 240 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 2001 
WL 825957 (October 1, 2001). We noted that in Banks, we 
had required Banks to return to state court because even 
we believed the relaxed waiver rule might well apply. How 
can we expect Banks to have predicted the ultimate ruling 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when we could not? 
 
In Fahy we stated: 
 
          When state law is unclear regarding the operation of a 
          procedural filing requirement, the petitioner files in 
          state court because of his or her reasonable belief that 
          a S 2254 petition would be dismissed as unexhausted, 
          and the state petition is ultimately denied on these 
          grounds, then it would be unfair not to toll the statute 
          of limitations during the pendency of that state petition 
          up to the highest reviewing state court. 
 
Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d at 245. 
 
The same rule applies here. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court had denied Banks's first PCRA petition in March 
1995, and he had filed his first habeas petition in February 
1996. Thus, his federal action was pending when AEDPA 
was passed in April 1996. Because the district court 
determined that Banks's claims could be adjudicated and 
the petition was not subject to dismissal as mixed, it was 
not until the Third Circuit reversed that determination and 
ordered the petition dismissed as mixed in September 1997 
that it would be equitable to begin calculating a delay in 
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filing against Banks, and because he filed his second PCRA 
petition while the appeal was still pending, there was no 
delay whatsoever. Subsequently, here, as in Fahy , Banks 
did not delay in seeking federal relief, filing his habeas 
petition two weeks after his state collateral proceedings 
were concluded. Thus, the equities are in his favor. Not 
only is there "no evidence of abuse of the process" by 
Banks, but it seems as clear as in Fahy's case that he 
"diligently and reasonably asserted his claims." Id. at 244- 
45. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court was 
quite correct in its resort to equitable principles, and 
properly entertained Banks's petition on its merits, as we 
will as well. 
 
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
We granted Banks a Certificate of Appealability regarding 
two issues: 
 
(1) Banks contends that the trial court erred in not 
having explored whether he was making a knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel 
during the trial. However, the District Court concluded 
that, by pursuing his own strategy at trial, Banks's 
situation was one of hybrid representation, but that there 
was no clear requirement under either United States 
Supreme Court precedent, nor under our case law, that a 
defendant "is entitled to an inquiry by the trial court before 
it exercises its discretion to permit hybrid representation." 
Banks VIII, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 543. 
 
(2) Banks contends that the jury instructions and 
verdict sheets during the penalty phase violated Mills v. 
Maryland, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
unreasonably applied the Supreme Court precedent in 
finding that his death sentence was not constitutionally 
infirm.7 The District Court rejected Banks's challenge, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The District Court had granted a certificate regarding the Mills issue 
and we enlarged it to include the Sixth Amendment issue. Ouska v. 
Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 2001). The Third 
Circuit's Local Appellate Rules provide: "If the district court grants a 
certificate of appealability as to only some issues, the court of appeals 
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reasoning that it was to evaluate whether Mills  applied only 
to Banks's trial and direct appeal, and concluded that it did 
not, since Banks's conviction became final before Mills was 
decided and Mills has not been made retroactive by the 
United States Supreme Court. The District Court further 
distinguished our holding in Frey v. Fulcomer , 132 F.3d 916 
(3d Cir. 1997), reasoning that Frey involved a pre-AEDPA 
petition. Id. at 543-44. 
 
We will address these issues in turn. 
 
(1) Waiver of Representation of Counsel  
 
Banks urges that the trial court should have conducted 
a colloquy with him, establishing that he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel before allowing 
Banks to engage in certain conduct during the trial, 
contrary to the advice of his counsel. Banks was 
represented throughout the proceeding, but he contends 
that he took over certain "core functions" at times, such 
that a colloquy was required. 
 
Clearly, Banks and his counsel disagreed as to whether 
he should testify, and as to the scope of the testimony. 
Banks wanted to testify because he believed that it was 
critical for him to expose the conspiracy that he urged 
resulted in the deaths and in altered injuries to those he 
was accused of killing. During his testimony, therefore, 
Banks introduced the coroner's reports and photographs 
that had been ruled inadmissible prior to trial. Although 
counsel and the trial court warned Banks that the pictures 
were inflammatory, and that his testimony about the 
pictures and his showing them to the jury would allow the 
prosecutors to use them as well, Banks insisted that he 
was "forced into this," and that the pictures were "part of 




will not consider uncertified issues unless petitioner first seeks, and 
the 
court of appeals grants certification of additional issues." 3d Cir. R. 
22.1(b). 
 
We note that the issue of Banks's competency to stand trial was 
previously litigated on appeal and is not before us. 
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Banks also, and again contrary to the advice of counsel, 
insisted that the medical examiners be questioned about 
details and supposed inconsistencies in the photographs. 
The colloquy between counsel and the trial court before the 
recall of one of the medical examiners is telling: 
 
           Defendant: [T]hey're asking me to do the questioning. 
          I prefer not to, because I'm not qualified to do it. 
 
           The Court: Then I will ask you to consult with 
          counsel and I will ask counsel to prepare and ask the 
          questions. 
 
           [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, the three of us have 
          reviewed this, and we can't conceive of any questions 
          to ask the doctor. 
 
           The Court: Mr. Banks will discuss with you the 
          questions he proposes to ask, and I think counsel 
          should ask the questions. 
 
Banks himself also cross-examined a deputy coroner and a 
police officer. 
 
There is no question that the defendant's testimony and 
the introduction of the previously excluded photographs 
were, as the Court predicted, inflammatory. There is also 
no question that the testimony, the introduction of the 
photographs, and the examinations of the witnesses were 
contrary to the advice of counsel, and eroded the 
protections counsel had secured for Banks prior to trial. We 
note that the trial court warned Banks repeatedly of his 
need to adhere to the rules of the court and insisted that 
where the rules of evidence and procedure were concerned 
it would "treat [Banks] like a lawyer," and that one could 
infer from the court's phrasing that Banks was to some 
extent acting as his own counsel. At no point, however, did 
Banks request that counsel withdraw and that he be 
allowed to proceed pro se. 
 
The issue that Banks has presented to us is whether, 
even absent an affirmative declaration of a desire to 
proceed pro se, his actions were so contrary to counsel's 
advice and involved such significant control over his 
defense as to render him effectively unrepresented, and 
whether, if we so find, the trial court should have 
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concluded that Banks was effectively proceeding pro se and 
should have conducted a Sixth Amendment waiver inquiry 
before allowing Banks to testify. The issue that we must 
actually resolve, however, is much more circumscribed, 
because of the scope of review under AEDPA. That is to say, 
our analysis is limited to whether the court failed to apply, 
or misapplied, clearly established U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent. The first step in our analysis, therefore, is to 
define whether any U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
mandated -- either directly or by extension to these facts -- 
that the trial court personally ensure that Banks was 
making a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a setting such as this. 
We note that the trial court did discuss certain rights with 
Banks before he testified: 
 
           Mr. Banks, once again, I will preface my remarks by 
          saying this is not a lecture. This is a responsibility I 
          have as a trial judge, to be assured that you 
          understand the rights that you have and the rights, by 
          testifying, that you'll give up. 
 
In the course of this discussion, the court advised Banks 
that he had a right not to testify and that he could be 
prejudiced if he disregarded counsel's advice by his 
testimony and by introducing exhibits as part of his 
testimony. But the court never specifically inquired as to a 
waiver by Banks of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel: 
 
           You understand, do you not, that the procedure is 
          that counsel ask questions? May I suggest to you then 
          that I will give you some time. You will consult with 
          your counsel, so that you may give them the questions, 
          so that they can properly phrase them for you. 
 
           Let me caution you on another matter that might 
          come up. You understand if you propose to use any 
          exhibits, that you will be required to comply with the 
          rules of evidence concerning exhibits. 
 
The court did inquire whether Banks understood that he 
was not required to testify, that he had a constitutional 
right to remain silent, and that by testifying he would give 
up the right to remain silent. When Banks asked if he 
could continue to rely on the Fifth Amendment, the court 
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explained to him that he could not, assuring Banks that "I 
don't want you to do anything that will harm you." The 
court further explained that the testimony might open 
avenues for questioning that would otherwise remain closed 
and urged Banks to follow counsel's advice. Throughout the 
discussion, Banks remained adamant that he wanted to 
testify. Thus, in evaluating the case law we are not 
assessing the quality of the inquiry made by the trial court, 
but only whether an inquiry specific to the waiver of 
counsel was mandated. 
 
The two Supreme Court opinions referenced by the 
parties, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), reh'g denied, 
465 U.S. 1112, address situations that are different from 
the case before us, not only on the facts, but also on the 
principles that informed the Court's decisions. Faretta 
recognizes that a defendant who indicates a desire to 
represent himself and proceed without counsel has the 
right to do so, as long as he knowingly and intelligently 
waives his right to counsel. The defendant in Faretta 
wanted to manage his own defense; he did not want 
counsel to act on his behalf. The issue before the court was 
the extent to which a defendant has the right to present his 
own defense. The Court concluded that "the defendant . . . 
must be free personally to decide whether in his particular 
case counsel is to his advantage." 422 U.S. at 834. That 
decision must be honored by the court, even if the choice 
is detrimental, "out of `that respect for the individual which 
is the lifeblood of the law.' " Id. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 
U.S. 337, 350-351 (1970), reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 915). 
 
The Court recognized that managing one's own defense 
results in the relinquishment of "the traditional benefits 
associated with the right to counsel." 422 U.S. at 835. It is 
the relinquishing of these benefits that triggers the 
requirement of a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. 
Id. at 835. 
 
In McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), reh'g 
denied, 465 U.S. 1112, the Supreme Court addressed the 
scope of the right to conduct one's own defense, holding 
that this right was not violated by the unsolicited 
participation of standby counsel. Again, the focus of the 
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Court was on determining to what extent a court could 
circumscribe a defendant's right to present his own 
defense. The Court found that the appointment and limited 
participation of standby counsel was not inconsistent with 
the "dignity and autonomy of the accused." Id. at 177. The 
Court noted that a "defendant does not have a 
constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by 
counsel." Id. at 183. The interest of the court in appointing 
standby counsel is to assist the defendant to comply with 
court rules and protocol and enable him to achieve"his 
own clearly indicated goals." Id. at 184. 
 
While McKaskle provides guidance to courts as to where 
the line is crossed between the assistance or enabling of 
standby counsel to an already pro se defendant and 
impermissible intrusion, it does not provide any guidance 
to courts for the reverse situation, i.e., when does a 
defendant who is represented by counsel cross the line 
from being represented to proceeding pro se? We cannot 
say that either Faretta or McKaskle, both affirmations of the 
liberty and autonomy rights of a defendant, define a line of 
self-expression that defendants cannot cross without the 
court's securing of a knowing, voluntary and intelligent 
waiver. 
 
Banks agreed to the continued representation by his 
counsel throughout trial, and while he performed some 
tasks contrary to counsel's advice, he never did so 
unattended or unadvised by counsel. In fact, it is clear from 
the record that he received counsel's advice on an ongoing 
basis. A disagreement between counsel and a defendant is 
not enough in itself to render a defendant pro se. Hakeem 
v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 765 (3d Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the 
cases requiring a waiver colloquy when the defendant 
indicates a desire to proceed pro se do not in themselves 
dictate such a procedure here. 
 
Moreover, to the extent that Banks has urged that the 
right to testify on one's behalf -- which was perhaps the 
most troubling of Banks's strategic decisions -- should be 
somehow constricted if necessary to ensure Sixth 
Amendment rights, this seems to run directly counter to 
Faretta, and its focus on an individual's right to control his 
defense. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. Further, we know of no 
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case that interposes a requirement of a colloquy in 
connection with the right to testify on one's own behalf.8 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis focused 
solely on Banks's decision as an exercise of his right to 
testify on his own behalf. It did not view Banks's choices as 
implicating his Sixth Amendment rights.9  Banks says that 
this analysis is contrary to a line of cases that stand for the 
proposition that such a colloquy is required when there is 
"hybrid representation," that is, where an attorney and a 
defendant each address the court or in other ways share 
defense functions.10 
 
In the typical hybrid representation, a trial court acts in 
its discretion to appoint standby counsel for a pro se 
defendant who later challenges the attorney's role as overly 
intrusive under Faretta's right to self-representation. See, 
e.g., McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984), reh'g 
denied, 465 U.S. 1112. Some federal courts have opined 
that a colloquy should be conducted when the defendant 
assumes "core functions" of the defense. 
 
          When the accused assumes functions that are at the 
          core of the lawyer's traditional role . . . he will often 
          undermine his own defense. Because he has a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In Boardman v. Estelle, the Ninth Circuit analogized a right to 
allocution to the right to testify in one's own behalf and characterized 
them as "entirely separate. . . . A defendant who elects representation by 
counsel does not simultaneously waive his right to testify at trial." 957 
F.2d 1523, 1528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 904 (1992). Likewise, 
the exercise of one's personal right to testify is not tantamount to 
proceeding pro se. 
 
9. The dissent in Banks II, however, both viewed the issue as raising 
Sixth Amendment concerns and viewed the trial court as violating 
Banks's Sixth Amendment rights. See discussion, infra at n. 11." 
 
10. Interestingly, Banks's approach to this issue seems to have come full 
circle and, at oral argument, his counsel argued the issue precisely as 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had characterized it, namely, as a duty 
to prevent Banks from testifying. And, in its brief, it quotes the 
extensive 
colloquy between Banks and the trial court before, and during, his 
testimony, and urges that the court should have mentioned the right to 
counsel and warned of inherent danger in waiving counsel. We find no 
support for the proposition under Faretta or McKaskle, nor has any 
Supreme Court case been referenced as authority for this proposition. 
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          constitutional right to have his lawyer perform core 
          functions, he must knowingly and intelligently waive 
          that right. 
 
United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720,721 (9th Cir. 1982). 
But see United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (cross-examination of some witnesses, asking of 
questions of defense counsel, proposing questions for other 
witnesses and delivering closing argument did not require 
the trial court to give waiver warnings); see also Bontempo 
v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954, 960 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
460 U.S. 1055 (1983) (supplemental closing statement); 
Robinson v. United States, 897 F.2d 903, 906-07 (7th Cir. 
1990) (same). 
 
As we have noted, under the standards of Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), we may challenge the state 
court analysis only if it is contrary to or unreasonably 
applies clearly established federal law. It is unclear whether 
it must be stated in Supreme Court precedent, or whether 
it may be derived from principles enunciated in Supreme 
Court precedent. Id. at 408-09 ("Today's case does not 
require us to decide how such `extension of legal principle' 
cases should be treated under S 2254(d)(1)."). Regardless, 
we conclude that the federal decisions do not apply so 
directly to the facts at hand so as to constitute an 
extension of principles enunciated in Supreme Court 
precedent. The lack of clearly applicable principles in such 
precedent is fatal to Banks's argument. While the decisions 
Banks cites might inform our decision were we reviewing a 
district court trial, we are not here engaged in"the broad 
exercise of supervisory power" that we would possess over 
a district trial court decision. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 
U.S. 637, 642 (1974) (quoting from the appellate court 
opinion, 473 F.2d 1236, 1238 (1st Cir. 1973)). See, e.g., 
United States v. Davis, 2001 WL 1173337 (5th Cir. October 
4, 2001) (reversing the district court's handling of hybrid 
representation situation). 
 
The Supreme Court has never addressed a situation such 
as this, let alone indicated that the situation would 
implicate a Sixth Amendment right in the same way as 
defendant's right to proceed without counsel, or the 
prerequisites to a defendant's proceeding pro se. Banks did 
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not reject the assistance of counsel; he acted with counsel's 
assistance, but chose to reject the advice of counsel. 
Although we have found some federal decisions that have 
adapted the case law to "hybrid" factual settings, we find 
none of these rulings to be persuasive extensions of U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent so as to constitute clearly 
established law regarding Sixth Amendment violations in 
such a fact pattern.11 Further, many of the decisions are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We note that Banks cites several Pennsylvania cases that he 
contends bear on the issue before us: Commonwealth v. Bell, 276 A.2d 
834 (Pa. 1971); Commonwealth v. McGrogan, 297 A.2d 456 (Pa. 1972); 
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 462 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. 1983). In one, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the introduction of evidence is 
a function that is allocated solely to counsel. Commonwealth v. Bell, 276 
A.2d 834 (Pa. 1971). In Banks I, Chief Justice Nix dissented, and was 
joined in his dissent by Justice Zappala, because he concluded that, in 
accordance with Bell, Banks had assumed a function allocated to 
counsel and "was acting as his own attorney and was representing 
himself." 521 A.2d at 23. While Chief Justice Nix's interpretation of 
Pennsylvania case law would require a waiver colloquy so as to afford 
federal constitutional protections, his was not the majority opinion. None 
of the Pennsylvania cases referred to us by Banks appears to be directly 
on point. Further, it is not our province to determine whether the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision was contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, its own precedent, but, rather, of clearly 
established federal precedent. 
 
The three federal cases that Banks cites in addition to McKaskle and 
Faretta as defining an "exclusive province of counsel" at trial are 
inapposite. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) is concerned 
exclusively with whether appellate counsel is obligated to raise all 
nonfrivolous claims proffered by the appellant. See id. at n. 7. In Vess 
v. 
Peyton, 352 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 953 (1966), 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that there 
was no error in appellant's not having been provided counsel at a 
preliminary hearing (a determination that is no longer good law) and that 
the record supported the conclusion that appellant's guilty plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily offered. The court also rejected appellant's 
contention that the failure to call certain witnesses suggested by the 
defendant did not constitute inadequate representation of counsel. 
Likewise, Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1978) 
rejected a claim that an uncalled out-of-state witness constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel. None of these cases could be read to 
mandate that a trial judge treat defendant's insistence upon testifying, 
and his introduction of evidence as part of that testimony -- or even the 
directing and conducting of the cross-examination-- as an assertion of 
a right to proceed pro se. 
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unpublished and have no precedential value.12 Accordingly, 
we agree with the District Court that Banks is not entitled 
to habeas relief on this ground. 
 
(2) Application of Mills v. Maryland in the Penalty 
          Phase 
 
Banks contends that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
determination regarding the jury instructions and verdict 
slip during the penalty phase involved an unreasonable 
application of Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). The 
District Court did not disturb the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court's ruling regarding the penalty phase, reasoning that 
Mills v. Maryland was not retroactive, and also stating in 
summary fashion that "Supreme Court precedent (in the 
form of Mills and McKoy) did not require an outcome 
contrary to that reached by the state courts." Banks VIII at 
544. We disagree with both conclusions. 
 
          (a) Does Mills Apply? 
 
We first note that the District Court apparently 
misperceived the way in which the AEDPA standard applies 
to the relevant state court proceeding. The Court stated 
that the Mills decision was rendered in 1988, five years 
after Banks's conviction and sentence. 
 
However, the point in time at which the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence must have been "clearly established" is at the 
time that the state court makes the ruling on the federal 
constitutional issue that is being scrutinized. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its opinion in Banks II, 
construing Mills in 1995, eight years after Mills became law. 
If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had questioned whether 
Mills was applicable to the trial court's conduct, we would 
have needed to inquire whether Mills codified law that was 
clearly established at the time of the trial. But that is not 
the question before us. AEDPA defines the parameters of 
federal court review of state determinations of federal law. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See, e.g., Robinson v. United States, 897 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Parker, 176 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished); 
Islam v. Miller, 166 F.3d 1200 (2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished); United States 
v. Demeke, 152 F.3d 921 (2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished). 
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In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion, it applied 
Mills. We are being asked to determine whether that 
application of Mills was contrary to, or an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established federal law. To make that 
determination, it is only the state court's decision that cited 
to Mills and the law as it was clearly established then, in 
1995, not the law at the time of Banks's sentencing, that 
matters. 
 
          (b) Are We Compelled to Conduct a Retroactivity 
          Analysis under Teague? 
 
The Commonwealth also argues that we should not apply 
the lessons of Mills to Banks's case, because Banks's 
conviction became final before Mills was decided, and 
because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently 
decided that Mills is not retroactive. Under Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989), reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031 
(1989), retroactivity is a "threshold question," because it is 
in that determination that a court establishes whether a 
rule enunciated on the basis of a set of facts will apply only 
prospectively or will be applied retroactively to all who are 
similarly situated. See id. at 299-301. 13 Retroactivity 
analyses can be complex, but here the analysis is not, 
because we do not need to focus on anything other than 
the reasoning and determination of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. We acknowledge that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has stated that it will not give retroactive 
effect to "new rules" handed down after a conviction has 
become final.14 We acknowledge further that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Because we find Teague not to govern our analysis, our discussion of 
its principles are limited to explaining why it is not controlling here, 
despite the arguments of the parties. We note, however, that recent 
decisions have called into question to what extent Teague has continued 
force independent of AEDPA. See, e.g., Tyler v. Cain, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 
2483-84 (June 28, 2001) (rejecting application of the Teague exceptions 
to construe Cage, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) as retroactive under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2244(b)(2)(A)). 
 
14. "[A] new rule of law will not be applied retroactively `to any case on 
collateral review unless that decision was handed down during the 
pendency of appellant's direct appeal and the issue was properly 
preserved there or . . . was nonwaivable.' " Commonwealth v. Cross, 726 
A.2d 333, 338 (Pa. 1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 516 A.2d 
1180, 1183 (1986)). 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically noted its 
skepticism regarding the retroactive application of Mills to 
cases other than non-final sentences, see, e.g. , 
Commonwealth v. Cross, 726 A.2d 333, 338 n. 4, (Pa. 
1999), and that it disagrees with our ruling in Frey.15 See 
Cross, 726 A.2d at 337. 
 
However, the ruling in Banks II is what determines the 
scope of our review, and in Banks II, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that, following its previous rulings in 
this area, the sentencing process did not violate Mills. To 
determine whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
ruling in Banks was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, we 
do not need to undertake any retroactivity analysis, 
because, notably, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
undertook none. It examined the penalty phase on the 
merits based on Mills, making no reference to any concerns 
regarding Mills' applicability to the case. Banks II, 656 A.2d 
470. 
 
The government argues that if we are considering the 
applicability of a new rule (assuming Mills is a new rule -- 
which is not at all clear16), we must be guided by Teague v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has asserted that it has 
"concurrent jurisdiction" with this court"as to federal constitutional 
questions" and as such may "formulate its own interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent, which may be in opposition to that stated by 
the lower federal courts." Cross, 726 A.2d at 338 n. 4. At the same time, 
the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a federal court 
must apply independent judgment in its interpretation of federal law and 
if, "after carefully weighing all the reasons for accepting a state 
court's 
judgment, a federal court is convinced that a prisoner's custody . . . 
violates the Constitution, that independent judgment should prevail." 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 389. 
 
16. To the extent that Teague still provides the appropriate scheme for 
analysis, see supra n. 13, we note that the Sixth Circuit has explicitly 
found that Mills does not comprise a "new rule" under Teague. Gall v. 
Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 322 (6th Cir. 2000), reh'g and reh'g en banc 
denied; cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 2577 (2001). Accord, 
DeShields v. Snyder, 829 F. Supp. 676, 688 (D. Del. 1993). Other courts 
have determined that it is immaterial whether Mills is a new rule, 
because, whether or not the rule is new, it falls within the second 
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Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 
U.S. 151 (1997), and refuse to apply such new rule unless 
one of the two narrow exceptions referenced in the case law 
applies.17 However, we conclude that we need not explore 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
exception of Teague. See, e.g., Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th 
Cir.), 
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 (1992). The Fifth and the Eighth Circuit, in 
contrast, have classified Mills as a new rule. See, e.g., Miller v. 
Lockhart, 
65 F.3d 676, 686 (8th Cir. 1995); Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d 167, 173 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1067 (1992). Both of these cases are 
distinguishable, however. In Cordova the Fifth Circuit summarily 
concluded that Teague precluded it from applying a decision announced 
after Cordova's conviction was final. The court supplied no analysis nor 
explanation to support its conclusion. 953 F.2d at 173. In Miller, only 
one of the four significant pre-Mills cases had been decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court prior to Miller's conviction, and that decision, Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), was a plurality opinion whose fractured 
opinions were considered in Miller not to" `compel' the further holding 
that a unanimity requirement for mitigating circumstances is 
unconstitutional." 65 F.3d at 686. The other three decisions--that were 
decided prior to Banks's conviction becoming final--were Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (applying Lockett in a 5-4 decision with 
two concurrences); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) 
(characterizing the rules that a sentencer may not be precluded from 
considering any "aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of 
the circumstances of the offense" and "that a sentencer may not refuse 
to consider or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating 
evidence" as well established; there were six justices in the majority and 
three concurring); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) 
(unanimously holding that mitigating evidence was wrongly excluded 
from consideration). 
 
17. The two exceptions are: 
 
(1) "rules `forbidding criminal punishment o f certain primary conduct 
[and] rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of 
defendants because of their status or offense' " O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 
U.S. 151, 157 (1997) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 330 
(1989)); 
 
(2) " `watershed rules' of criminal proce dure implicating the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." O'Dell at 
157 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993), reh'g denied, 507 
U.S. 968.). 
 
As noted in supra n. 16, the Fourth Circuit has found Mills to fall 
within the second Teague exception. 
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the contours of Mills (and its predecessors) as to whether it 
is "new;" nor do we need to consider, as the parties have 
done, the applicability of the exceptions. This is because, as 
the brief of amici curiae notes,18 resort to Teague is 
misplaced. Teague teaches that the federal courts in habeas 
corpus proceedings should be reluctant to apply new rules 
of federal jurisprudence in state court cases decided before 
such new rules were handed down. Principles of comity and 
finality counsel that we maintain a circumscribed scope of 
habeas review. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308. Here, however, as 
we have noted, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied 
Mills. We are examining the application of Mills, not 
because we wish to impose a new rule not considered by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but as the court in fact 
did consider and apply it.19 In such a situation, Teague is 
not implicated. Accordingly, we need ask only whether the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's application of Mills should 
be disturbed under the AEDPA standards.20  
 
          (c) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Application 
          of Mills 
 
We disagree with the District Court's refusal to address 
how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied Mills  in 
Banks II. We do, however, agree with the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Brief of Amici Curiae, The Pennsylvania Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers and Louis Natali, Esq., Supporting Appellants. We are 
grateful to amici for their careful reasoning and research. Their brief 
was 
thorough and expertly written; more, it was genuinely helpful. 
 
19. As we reference below, the precise holding of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court was that "[n]either the jury instructions, the jury poll nor 
the verdict slips in the instant matter contained language which would 
violate the dictates of Mills." Banks II, 656 A.2d at 470. 
 
20. The District Court never really addressed this issue because it 
concluded that neither Mills nor Frey  should apply. However, since the 
parties have extensively briefed the issue before us, we will address it 
and decide it, rather than remanding to the District Court. Hein v. FDIC, 
88 F.3d 210, 221(3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Hein v. McNeil, 
519 U.S. 1056 (1997) ("To the extent that we can decide these issues as 
a matter of law without further factual development, we serve the 
interests of judicial economy as well as the interests of the parties in 
avoiding unnecessary re-litigation.") 
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that, in any event, our analysis would not be dictated by 
Frey -- which was pre-AEDPA -- but by the AEDPA 
standard. Thus, we must ask whether the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court determination regarding the 
constitutionality of the instructions, verdict slip, and polling 
of the jury involved an unreasonable application of Mills. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on its own 
precedents to conclude that the sentencing proceedings in 
Banks did not violate Mills, dismissing each of Banks's 
contentions in turn. "This [jury] instruction, which mirrors 
the language found in the death penalty statute of our 
Sentencing Code, has previously been reviewed by this 
Court and determined not to violate Mills." Banks II, 656 
A.2d at 470. "The form of verdict slip employed in the 
instant matter was virtually identical to that considered by 
this Court in Commonwealth v. Frey and determined not to 
infer to the jury a requirement of unanimity with respect to 
mitigating circumstances." Id. (Citation omitted). "Nor do 
the answers provided by the individual jurors during the 
poll suggest in any manner that they believed unanimity 
was required in finding mitigating circumstances." Id. The 
court then concluded, "In sum, neither the instructions of 
the court nor the printed instructions on the verdict slips 
nor the questions and responses of the court and jury 
during polling, standing alone or viewed in total, infer a 
requirement of unanimity which would violate the dictates 
of Mills." Id. at 471. 
 
Consistently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on 
its own prior determinations in upholding Banks's 
sentencing proceedings. Our task is to review state court 
proceedings not to ensure the consistency of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's application of its law, but, 
rather, to assure proper application of United States 
Supreme Court teachings. In Williams v. Taylor , the 
Supreme Court approvingly quoted the Seventh Circuit: 
 
           Section 2254(d) requires us to give state courts' 
          opinions a respectful reading, and to listen carefully to 
          their conclusions, but when the state court addresses 
          a legal question, it is the law `as determined by the 
          Supreme Court of the United States' that prevails. 
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529 U.S. at 387 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 
(7th Cir. 1996)). 
 
The United States Supreme Court has provided ample 
guidance in this area. There are two overarching themes in 
Mills that are further clarified in Boyde v. California, 494 
U.S. 370 (1990), reh'g denied 495 U.S. 924. First, if under 
the sentencing scheme it is possible for jurors to agree that 
mitigating circumstances exist, but, because of a lack of 
unanimity as to which mitigating circumstances exist, to 
conclude that they may not consider those circumstances, 
the sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. Mills , 486 U.S. 
at 374. Second, and related to the first, the critical question 
is not whether a constitutional construction is possible, but 
whether a reasonable jury could have interpreted the 
instructions in an unconstitutional manner, that is, as 
restricting them to finding only those mitigating 
circumstances as to which all can agree. Id. at 375-76. We 
conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to 
analyze the penalty phase of Banks's trial in accordance 
with these principles, and, as a consequence, unreasonably 
applied Mills. As Judge Padova recently pointed out in 
granting habeas relief in a very similar case, Hackett v. 
Price, 2001 WL 884721 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2001), the state 
court 
 
          misconstrue[d] the court's task in examining for Mills 
          error by focusing on the meaning of the statute rather 
          than on the issue of jury confusion. As Mills  instructs, 
          it is the danger of jury misinterpretation of the 
          statutory scheme, rather than the existence of a 
          constitutional interpretation of the statute by the 
          courts, that creates the Mills problem. 
 
Id. at *19. 
 
We must conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ruling involved an unreasonable application of Mills.21 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Banks argues that, in fact, the determination was "contrary to" Mills, 
because it violated Mills' dictates. We think the better analysis, since 
the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court referenced Mills and seemed to be 
considering how it impacted the Banks case, is to rely on the 
"unreasonable application," which, in any event, is clearly evident. 
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fact, we conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ruled that there was no Mills violation without ever really 
applying the teachings of Mills, and by examining the 
statute, not the potential for confusion by jurors in what 
they were told to do. Further, as noted in Hackett, Mills 
itself involved a situation in which the statute had been 
interpreted to be constitutional, but the Supreme Court 
vacated the sentence based on the risk of confusion. Id. at 
19. 
 
We will examine each aspect of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's analysis of the jury's involvement in the 
penalty phase -- the instructions themselves, the verdict 
slip, and the polling of the jury following the sentencing 
verdict. 
 
          i. Jury Instructions 
 
In Banks II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted 
three lines of the jury instructions: 
 
           The sentence you impose will depend upon your 
          findings concerning aggravating and mitigating 
          circumstances. The Crime[s] Code in this 
          Commonwealth provides that the verdict must be a 
          sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least 
          one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating 
          circumstance, or if the jury unanimously finds one or 
          more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any 
          mitigating circumstance or circumstances. The verdict 
          must be a sentence of life imprisonment in all other 
          cases. 
 
656 A.2d at 470. 
 
The court then opined that because the instruction 
"mirrors the language found in the death penalty statute of 
our Sentencing Code [that] has previously been reviewed by 
this court and determined not to violate Mills " Banks's 
claim was "without merit." Id.22 (citing Commonwealth v. 
Hackett, 627 A.2d 719 (1993); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Hackett, as noted above, was recently vacated by the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania. See 2001 WL 884721. Post-conviction relief was denied 
in O'Shea in 1999 at 726 A.2d 376, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1119 (2000). 
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633 A.2d 1100 (1993), rearg. denied (1994); Commonwealth 
v. O'Shea, 567 A.2d 1023 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 
(1990)). 
 
In Hackett, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had 
attempted to distinguish Mills based on the Maryland 
statute, reasoning that since the Maryland statute barred 
consideration of mitigating evidence unless there was 
unanimous agreement and the Pennsylvania statute 
required unanimity as to the absence of a mitigating 
circumstance, the Pennsylvania statute allowed individual 
jurors to prevent death sentences but not to compel them. 
See Hackett, 2001 WL 884721 at *19. The differences in the 
statutes were not enough to render the Pennsylvania 
statute constitutional, since the danger of jury 
misinterpretation was present in both statutes, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had examined only the 
statute, not the possibility that the jury had been confused 
by the instructions given. Boyde v. California , 494 U.S. 370 
(1990), reh'g denied 495 U.S. 924, established that the jury 
instructions must be considered in the context of the entire 
proceeding, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure 
to do so was contrary to clearly established federal law. Id. 
at 21. Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
essentially ignored the teachings of Boyde and engaged the 
same reasoning regarding the constitutionality of the 
instructions as in Hackett -- itself constitutionally defective. 
 
Proper application of Mills requires at the outset that the 
reviewing court examine the entire jury instructions, posing 
the "critical question" whether a reasonable jury could have 
concluded from the instruction that unanimity was 
required to find a mitigating circumstance. Mills, 486 U.S. 
at 370. Also, the Boyde standard requires that the court 
view the instruction in its totality, not examine in isolation 
a few sentences that reference the Crimes Code. Boyde, 494 
U.S. at 378. 
 
In Boyde, the Supreme Court iterated the standard of 
evaluating jury instructions as "whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the 
challenged instruction in a way that prevents the 
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence," Id. at 
380, and it reiterates the Mills principle that jury 
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instructions must be carefully considered in their entirety. 
Mills, 486 U.S. at 384. "[A] single instruction to a jury may 
not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in 
the context of the overall charge." Boyde, 494 U.S. at 378. 
In Banks II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court never 
examined the jury instruction from that vantage point. 
Rather, it looked at one part of the instruction and found 
that it was acceptable because it tracked the permissible 
statutory provisions and did not "infer" a requirement of 
unanimity. 656 A.2d at 470. Its conclusion was based not 
on how a juror might interpret its content, but on its own 
previous statutory construction of the language at issue. 
Here, even more starkly than in Hackett, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court merely stated that the statutory language 
had been reviewed and "determined not to violate Mills." 
Banks II, 656 A.2d at 470. There was no further analysis. 
 
We will juxtapose the instructions given by the trial court 
with those we found in Frey to be constitutionally defective. 
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Frey Instructions                       Banks Instructions 
 
Members of the jury, you                Members of the jury, you 
must now decide whether                 must now decide whether 
this defendant should be                the defendant in this case is 
sentenced to death or life              to be sentenced to death or 
imprisonment. The sentence              to life imprisonment on 
will depend on your finding             seach of the Informations 
concerning aggravating and              upon which you have 
mitigating circumstances.               returned a verdict of guilty 
The Crimes Code provides                of murder in the first 
that the verdict must be a              degree. 
sentence of death if the jury            
unanimously finds at least              The sentence you will 
one aggravating                         impose will depend on 
circumstance and no                     your findings concerning 
mitigating circumstance, or if          aggravating and mitigating 
the jury unanimously finds              circumstances. The Crime 
one or more aggravating                 Code in this Commonwealth 
circumstances which                     provides that the verdict 
outweigh any mitigating                 must be a sentence of death 
circumstances. The verdict              if the jury unanimously 
must be a sentence of life in           finds at least one 
all other cases. Frey v.                aggravating circumstance 
Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916, 922             and no mitigating 
(3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,           circumstances, or if the jury 
524 U.S. 911 (1998).                    unanimously finds one or 
                                        more aggravating 
                                        circumstances which 
                                        outweigh any mitigating 
                                        circumstance or 
                                        circumstances. 
 
Remember that your verdict              Remember, under the law of 
must be a sentence of death             this Commonwealth, your 
if you unanimously find at              verdict must be a sentence 
least one aggravating                   of death if you unanimously 
circumstances (sic) and no              find at least one aggravating 
mitigating circumstances, or            circumstance and no 
if you unanimously find                 mitigating circumstance, 
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one or more aggravating                 or if you unanimously find 
circumstances which                     one or more aggravating 
outweigh any mitigating                 circumstances which then 
circumstances. In all other             outweigh any mitigating 
cases, your verdict must be a           circumstances. 
sentence of life 
imprisonment. Id.                       In all other cases, your 
                                        verdict would be life 
                                        imprisonment.                  
 
Now, the Commonwealth has               Once again, the 
the burden of proving                   Commonwealth has the 
aggravating circumstances               burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt.              aggravating circumstances 
. . . The defendant has the             beyond a reasonable doubt. 
burden of proving mitigating            The defendant has the 
circumstances but only by a             burden of proving 
preponderance of the                    mitigating circumstances by 
evidence. Id. at 923.                   a preponderance of the 
                                        evidence. 
 
                                        If, after conscientious and 
                                        thorough deliberations, you 
                                        are unable to agree on your 
                                        findings and your verdict, 
                                        you should report that to 
                                        me. 
 
While, as we have noted, Frey does not control our 
holding here, nonetheless our reasoning there regarding the 
Mills implications of a very similar jury charge is instructive 
and applicable.23 As we said in Frey: 
 
          Specifically, we must determine whether it is 
          reasonably likely that the jury could have understood 
          the charge to require unanimity in consideration of 
          mitigating evidence. We need not determine whether 
          the jurors did, in fact, understand the charge to 
          require unanimity in consideration of mitigating 
          evidence -- only whether it was reasonably likely. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. In his brief Banks sets out the jury instruction in Frey alongside 
those given here, and notes that the instruction given here was even 
more egregious than in Frey in terms of its import regarding the need for 
the jurors to "agree" on their "findings." We agree. 
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          Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380, 110 S. Ct. at 1197-98; Mills, 
          486 U.S. at 384, 108 S. Ct. at 1870. 
 
          Examining the language of the jury charge, we must 
          answer in the affirmative. First and foremost, read 
          in its entirety, the relevant portion of the jury 
          charge emphasizes the importance of a unanimous 
          finding, using the phrase frequently and in close 
          proximity to -- within seven words of -- the mitigating 
          circumstances clause. We describe the relevant portion 
          of the sentence: "if the jury unanimously finds at least 
          one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating 
          circumstance. . . ." Considering this close proximity -- 
          the clause is, to the ear and to the mind, one sound 
          bite -- it is quite possible that a juror would, 
          regardless of other qualifying language, believe that 
          mitigating circumstances had to be found 
          unanimously. 
 
          . . . . 
 
          Thus, the unanimity language in the Frey charge could 
          only modify the term "find," and hence the jury could 
          reasonably have believed that unanimity was required 
          in both its ultimate and interim conclusions, especially 
          given the close proximity we have described. 
 
          . . . . 
 
          Other parts of the Frey charge were more likely to 
          increase the confusion rather than lessen it. As in 
          Zettlemoyer, the Frey trial court made a point of 
          instructing the jury on the relevant burdens of proof 
          relating to both aggravating and mitigating 
          circumstances. 
 
          . . . . 
 
          [But] Unlike Zettlemoyer, where the court specifically 
          instructed the jury that aggravating circumstances 
          must be proven "unanimously, beyond a reasonable 
          doubt," the trial court here did not stress that the 
          different burdens that attach to aggravating and 
          mitigating circumstances also entail different 
          unanimity requirements. A lay jury might plausibly 
          conclude, therefore, that aggravating and mitigating 
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          circumstances must be discussed and unanimously 
          agreed to, as is typically the case when considering 
          whether a burden of proof has been met. Such an 
          understanding, however, is plainly inconsistent with 
          the requirements of Mills, and adds to our concern that 
          the jury could have understood the charge to require 
          unanimity in consideration of mitigating evidence. 
 
132 F.3d at 923-24. 
 
These same concerns dictate the same result here. The 
instruction here, like the one we examined in Frey, runs 
afoul of Mills, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
assessment of the instruction involved an unreasonable 
application of Mills. The instructions are in themselves 
ambiguous, allowing for a jury to infer that the requirement 
of unanimity applies both to aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. There is no way that a juror would 
understand that a mitigating circumstance could be 
considered by less than all jurors. Further, when the judge 
clarified the difference between aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, he described the requirements for finding 
aggravating circumstances and then said: 
 
          The defendant has the burden of proving mitigating 
          circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. The 
          preponderance of the evidence is a lesser burden of 
          proof than beyond a reasonable doubt. A 
          preponderance of the evidence exists where one side is 
          more believable than the other or, as has been 
          explained to you, a preponderance exists whenever the 
          scales tip ever so slightly. 
 
A reasonable juror could readily infer from the fact that 
the distinctions between the burden of proof were 
explained, but no mention was made of a distinction 
between a requirement of unanimity for a finding of 
aggravating circumstances and the requirement for 
mitigating circumstances, that the same requirement of 
unanimity applied. The Banks court went on to stress: 
 
           Remember, again, your verdict in each case must be 
          unanimous. It cannot be reached by a majority vote or 
          by any percentage. It must be the verdict of each and 
          every one of you. 
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Considered as a whole, the jury instructions leave no 
doubt that "there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
has applied the challenged instruction in a way that 
prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant 
evidence." Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380. 
 
ii. Verdict Slip 
 
In its review of the verdict slip, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court noted that the form of slip used was 
"virtually identical to" the one the court had considered in 
Commonwealth v. Frey and had "determined not to infer to 
the jury a requirement of unanimity with respect to 
mitigating circumstances." Banks II, 656 A.2d at 470. It 
therefore rejected as "unfounded" Banks's claim that the 
verdict slip "impermissibly suggested to the jury that it 
must find mitigating circumstances by unanimous vote." Id. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then reviewed the poll 
by the foreman but determined that, because both the oral 
instructions and the instructions on the verdict slip were 
proper, the situation was distinguishable from 
Commonwealth v. Young, 572 A.2d 1217 (1990), 
resentencing after remand aff 'd, 651 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1993), 
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012 (1994), in which the court had 
remanded for resentencing a case in which the oral 
instructions were inconsistent with the verdict sheet. See 
Banks II, 656 A.2d at 471. In Young, the jury charge 
required a sentence of death if "the jury unanimously finds 
at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating 
circumstance, or if the jury unanimously finds one or more 
aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating 
circumstances." Young, 572 A.2d at 1228. The verdict 
sheet, however, indicated that "We, the jury, unanimously 
find that the defendant has proven the following mitigating 
circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. 
(Emphasis in original). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
found that "[t]his inconsistency requires a remand of this 
case for resentencing. . . ." Id. In contrast, in Banks II, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found nothing in the verdict 
slip questions, or the jurors' responses, that would 
"indicate they believed they had to find mitigating 
circumstances unanimously." 656 A.2d at 471. 
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But, again, the court undertook a different inquiry from 
that required under Mills. Mills requires a court to assess 
whether a need for a unanimous finding of mitigating 
circumstances is one that "a reasonable jury could have 
drawn from . . . the verdict form employed." Mills, 486 U.S. 
at 375-76. 
 
Here, we cannot help but find that a reasonable juror 
could so conclude. In fact, we believe the form itself does 
suggest the need for unanimity. The verdict form is a three- 
page document, containing two "numbered" statements: 
 
          1. We the jury unanimously sentence the defendant in 
          the above matter to 
              X   Death 
                  Life Imprisonment 
 
          2. (To be completed if the Sentence is Death) 
          We the jury have found unanimously (emphasis 
          added) 
 
          ____ At least one aggravating circumstance a nd no 
          mitigating circumstances. The aggravated 
          circumstance(s) (is) (are): 
 
          1. ___ In the commission of the offense th e defendant 
          knowingly created a grave risk of death to 
          another person in addition to the victim of the 
          offense. 
 
          2. ___ The defendant has a significant his tory of felony 
          convictions involving the use or threat of 
          violence to the person. 
 
          3. ___ The defendant has been convicted of  another 
          federal or state offense, committed either before 
          or at the time of the offense at issue, for which 
          a sentence of life imprisonment or death was 
          imposable or the defendant was undergoing a 
          sentence of life imprisonment for any reason at 
          the time of the commission of the offense. 
 
          Or 
 
           X One or more aggravating circumst ances 
          which outweigh any mitigating circumstance 
          or circumstances. 
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           The aggravating circumstance(s) (is) (are): 
 
          1.     In the commission of th e offense the defendant 
          knowingly created a grave risk of death to 
          another person in addition to the victim of the 
          offense. 
 
          2.     The defendant has a sig nificant history of 
          felony convictions involving the use of threat of 
          violence to the person. 
 
          3.  X  The defendant has been con victed of another 
          federal or state offense, committed either 
          before or at the time of the offense at issue, for 
          which a sentence of life imprisonment or death 
          was imposable or the defendant was 
          undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment for 
          any reason at the time of the commission of 
          the offense. 
 
          The mitigating circumstance(s) (is) (are): 
 
          1.  X  The defendant was under th e influence of 
          extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
 
          2.     The capacity of the def endant to appreciate the 
          criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
          conduct to the requirements of law was 
          substantially impaired. 
 
          3.     Any other mitigating ma tter concerning the 
          character or record of the defendant or the 
          circumstances of his offense. 
 
Each form was marked as shown above and signed by the 
foreperson of the jury. 
 
We find it only reasonable to conclude that the form itself 
is at least confusing, and more likely suggestive, regarding 
the need for unanimity as to mitigating circumstances. The 
lead-in language to the overarching second question is "We 
the jury have found unanimously . . . ." By implication, 
everything that follows was found unanimously. What 
follows is a reference both to aggravating and to mitigating 
circumstances, with no additional language that would 
imply that there is a different standard for aggravating 
circumstances than there is for mitigating circumstances. 
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There is also no language anywhere on the form from which 
the jury could infer that a mitigating circumstance might be 
marked if only one juror had found that circumstance to 
exist. 
 
Thus, the structure and form of the verdict slip itself 
runs afoul of the dictates of Mills. Further, for the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to have ruled that there was 
no Mills violation without an examination of the content 
and implications of the verdict slip and without employing 
the proper inquiry was an unreasonable application of 
Mills. 
 
iii. Jury Poll 
 
Of the three elements -- the instructions, the verdict slip, 
and the jury poll -- the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
opinion devoted the greatest attention to the polling of the 
jury, actually quoting the trial court's words. The polling 
questions and answers never used the term "unanimous" 
regarding the verdict or the finding of any of the 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. While the jurors 
were asked whether they each found the "same" 
circumstances as the ones referred to before, it is difficult 
to say whether the questions were confusing in this regard. 
We do agree with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its 
view that the polling of a jury can compound the problem 
created by a questionable charge or verdict slip, as was the 
case in Young. Banks II, 656 A.2d at 471. Here, the polling 
does not appear either to add to or reduce the confusion as 
to the Mills problems we have already identified in the 




Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling 
regarding the application of Mills to the penalty phase 
instruction and verdict slip in Banks's trial was 
unreasonable, habeas relief will be granted and we will 
REVERSE the Order of the District Court and instruct it to 
GRANT a provisional writ of habeas corpus directed to the 
penalty phase. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may 
conduct a new sentencing hearing in a manner consistent 
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with this opinion within 120 days of this Order, or shall 
sentence Banks to life imprisonment. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
          Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
          for the Third Circuit 
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